Post-Psychoanalysis: Reconciling Praxis, Repression and Advocacy

Prospects for advocating on the behalf of anyone, or any issue, seems perplexing when such an act as advocating is considered in conversation with the tradition of psychoanalysis as well as with Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Truth and Method.  Psychoanalysis traditions suggest problems for advocacy in light of notions concerning repressed desire and an acting unconscious mind.  These concepts may open the field of advocacy to uncertainty and almost-assured, unintended consequences that are difficult to reconcile with perceived needs for action.  Gadamer, on the other hand, reminds us that our understanding of the world is flawed and, at best, partial due to historical prejudices we necessarily hold and exercise every time we interpret our world in language in order to achieve understanding but that such restrictions are the way in which we have a world at all.


Conversations resulting from the traditions of Gadamer and psychoanalysis seem to suggest that advocates need to consider carefully before taking action.  For Gadamer, advocacy in action seems to lead to further interpretations which by necessity either reinforce old prejudices or generate new prejudices.  However, because meaning can only be understood through the interpretations of those in the conversation, advocating actions may only generate as many understandings as there are people involved.  Psychoanalysis, on the other hand, suggests advocating on behalf of someone else will by necessity mean advocating for a person who really does not understand what they want because their desires are repressed and potentially hidden even from themselves.  Adding the repressed desires of the advocate into this mix only serves to further muddy the waters of advocacy while also suggesting that advocating in the interests of an individual, or a collective body of individuals, may only be accomplished through chance accident or simple luck.  These traditions in conversation with advocates may seemingly lead to inaction for a lack of clarity on desired purpose and outcome; however, inaction does not need to be the only result of a conversation with psychoanalysis and Gadamer’s method of understanding.


Gadamer introduces Aristotle into his conversation providing an impetus needed for an advocate to act.  Advocates are not giving voice to the needs of anyone, or anything, without first resolving themselves to action.  Aristotle’s notions of habituated, moral goodness and intellectual virtue in the form of phronesis not only admonish the advocate to act rightly in the right amount at the right time, but also gives guidance for what ideals advocates might choose to advocate.  In this regard, Aristotle reminds the advocate action is necessary through his concept of the praxis-oriented existence.  Even if we run the risk of suffering from unintended consequences resulting from our actions, we cannot allow fear to stultify our actions entirely.  Not acting is still an action.  Aristotle, however, demonstrates his prejudice when he explicates a world of governing in which better people advocate first for themselves and then for the lesser people in a different amount and to a different degree.  Aristotle’s prejudice need not dissuade us from recognizing that our actions determine our character.


Karl Marx helps us in this conversation by describing for us human social conditions against which we might advocate.  Marx strengthens Aristotle’s praxis-oriented existence by defining the essence of being human with other humans through his concept of life-activity.  If, as Marx suggests, human beings’ life-activity should be “free conscious activity”[1] then advocates might be well served to focus their energy on moving closer toward such a society.  It seems correct to suggest that “free conscious activity” (not to be read as being in opposition with Freud’s unconscious, repressed mind) feels like a good ideal for which to advocate for all human beings.  Free conscious activity, in this sense, may be indicative of human beings activity expressed through everyday labor; as for Marx and Aristotle, labor, or craftsmanship, was a defining quality of human character.


Whereas Marx points us toward a lofty goal on which to advocate for human beings within a society, John Stuart Mill also introduces us to a glimpse of a world allowing “free conscious activity” through an ideal of human beings actively expressing their beliefs and opinions in conjunction with the social body allowing determinations on where we stand in regard to the beliefs and opinions expressed by others to strengthen and refine the beliefs and prejudices we choose to hold in the moment.  Mill’s argument that free expression of opinion must be an integral part of a good State (or polis) begins from the inadequacies we suffer in the tradition of psychoanalysis (i.e. knowing only partial truths) as well as seemingly embodying the need for interpretations achieved only through conversation, as expressed by Gadamer, in order to achieve better understanding.  For Mill, “The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it.”[2]


In this regard, Mill asserts a potential primacy of need in seeking to avoid pitfalls laid before us by Gadamer and psychoanalysis.  It seems that if the advocate does not focus their advocacy efforts for change on behalf of individuals-of-a-State, as opposed to merely advocating for change on behalf of private and specific individuals and issues, then the advocate runs the risk of unintentionally hurting many while advocating on behalf of a few; or, advocating in favor of a stated problem that actually works in opposition to the needs of the one for which we advocate.


In this essay, I hope to persuade advocates to broaden the horizon of their advocacy work.  It seems to me that advocacy without principles may be no better than the clichéd reputations given to lawyers or a consumer product pitch exemplified in the tradition of television commercials.  In order more fully to understand the field of advocacy, I will explore what conditions psychoanalysis and Gadamer might put before an advocate.  With this framework of understanding, I will then try to demonstrate that we must still advocate and how we might try to best define our goals for the benefit of a better tomorrow.  Finally, I’ll look at how John Stuart Mill’s ideas concerning freedom of expression free us to advocate in new ways utilizing democratic traditions.


Sigmund Freud’s obstacles for the advocate appear to be most daunting in relation to the language expressed through dream work’s latent and manifest content.  In this system of understanding desire, the individual’s mind rarely speak its desires directly (i.e. in latent form) to the individual in a way they clearly understand; but, rather, desires are repressed behind a manifest language which demands interpretation.[3]  Freud asserts that the language in which our desires are expressed (i.e. in the form of dreams) is an archaic language the dreamer doesn’t understand.[4]  This archaic language is expressed primarily in images, however as Gadamer explains, humans understand their world in linguistic form; therefore, the language of desire—as expressed by Freud—speaks in a “raw material…and any expression of relations is omitted.”[5] 




This condition suggests that the language of desire is always inherently foreign to the dreamer of desires; however, Freud’s notion of psychoanalysis gives us a method to interpret the archaic language of dreams (and in turn desires) so that through interpretation we might bring repressed desire from the hidden depths of our unconscious mind to the forefront of our conscious mind.  In this regard, Freud and Gadamer cross paths producing a similar method for understanding.  In Truth and Method, Gadamer teaches us that interpretation is understanding.  Gadamer’s method for arriving at understanding (i.e. conversation[6]) closely mirrors Freud’s method of for interpreting dream work (i.e. free associated conversation.)  The primary difference between Freud and Gadamer, on this account of understanding, is produced in Freud’s assertion that an expert (i.e. a psychoanalyst) must be present in the conversation in order to produce reliable meaning.


Adam Phillips, however, cautions us to not accept Freud’s rule blindly.  According to Phillips, “The psychoanalyst is an expert on the ways in which the patient pretends to be an expert on [themselves].”[7]  Phillips further complicates the relationship between psychoanalyst and patient by attributing the motivating factor of trying to be accepted to the patient.  Not only does the patient not truly understand their own desires, but they also have an ulterior motive to reach a conclusion summarizing their desire in a fashion which they feel will not shock or offend the expert in that relationship (i.e. the psychoanalyst.)  Phillips allows us to see that, in this paradigm, the psychoanalyst then takes part in constructing the patient’s story which in turn validates the necessity of continuing to engage in this interpretative conversation solely with the psychoanalyst.  In most cases, it seems, the advocate for another person can be substituted into this model in place of the psychoanalyst while the person being advocated on behalf of then assumes the role of patient.


As Phillips says of seeking cure through psychoanalysis, “[T]here is no cure for the unconscious…knowledge can’t put a stop to that, only death can.”[8]  Gadamer helps us to understand that authority in conversation is not the path to better understanding.  Gadamer says, “Overhastiness is the source of errors that arise in the use of one’s own reason.  Authority, however, is responsible for one’s not using one’s own reason at all.”[9]  For Gadamer, understanding is interpretation and interpretation can only take place linguistically.  Taking this a step further, he relegates all human understanding and language as being subservient to verbal communication.  Gadamer says this is because our “conventions of meaning…have become sedimented in language.”[10]  In this sense, the expert (whether the psychoanalyst or the advocate) can only provide another interpretation for a patient to consider rather than being capable of providing the correct interpretation for any given situation.


Our inability to determine Truth, as proposed through the conversations of psychoanalysis and Hans-Georg Gadamer, cannot leave us inactive.  Without action in the physical world there seems to be little hope that the possibilities of tomorrow will form into anything better than today.  Gadamer’s insight into this fact reminds us that “we are always already in the situation of having to act…and hence we must already possess and be able to apply moral knowledge.”[11]  Gadamer introduces the writings of Aristotle to remind us of how we might find the inner solitude to act in the face of uncertainty in a world filled with many interpretations and no Truth.


In his manuscript Ethics, Aristotle teaches prudence (or phronesis) is the path to moral virtue in human affairs.  The ability to act accordingly in the right amount at the right time in the right way is Aristotle’s method for living virtuously.  When defining his method, Aristotle is careful to warn us that such a method cannot be defined in great detail because each situation in the human world of affairs must be assessed on its own merits.  Actions must be judged in context to the situation in which they are enacted.  A specific, codified set of rules for living the right way is no more possible than it is possible to plan a detailed response before a question has been posed.  Virtue is uncovered when a situation first requires a virtuous response.


From the work of Aristotle, we can understand that prudence in action exemplifies moral virtue.  In this sense, moral virtue can only be demonstrated in the physical world of actions; therefore, Aristotle lets us see moral virtue is not something a person is born with, but rather, is something formed by habits of action.  From Aristotle we understand that only through actions can intentions truly be judged.  In this vein of thought, Aristotle says, “Like activities produce like dispositions.”[12]  Any judgment of actions then becomes an interpretation which Gadamer has shown us is the only way we can understand our world. 




In this conversation, it must be assumed the advocate’s intention is trying to better the world.  Advocating on behalf of something worse tomorrow than we have today seems perverse and makes little sense.  The advocate must focus their attention on changing actions in order to form a better world.  To focus advocacy efforts on ideals that may change opinion is only effective if the change in opinion leads to a change in action.  If no action is produced from advocacy efforts, then likely the efforts of the advocate were unsuccessful and whatever the situation was that needed to be changed is probably still in need of change.  Therefore, if we can accept that advocating on behalf of actions is the best use of our limited time and energy; the advocate’s efforts are best focused on getting people to perform desired actions.  Aristotle teaches us, “we become just by performing just acts, temperate by performing temperate ones, brave by performing brave ones.”[13]


Now the advocate is left in a world of repressed desires only understandable through interpretation but also with a need to act.  Although verbal communication forms the basis of our interpretations, in order to be virtuous we must habitually perform virtuous acts in the moment.  We cannot know what constitutes a virtuous act until the moment to act is upon us and the moment to act is always already upon us.  This seems to leave the advocate in a worse place than before we started; however, the assumption is the advocate is always advocating on behalf of a tomorrow that is better than today.  If the advocate focuses on the concerns of a few, then the many may suffer.  So, it seems, the advocate must focus their attention on the concerns of the many.  When the needs and concerns of the many are satisfied the advocate’s job may be finished, but we can only know once we’ve reached such a day.


For today, the virtuous advocate must focus their efforts upon society.  Allowing Karl Marx’s voice into this conversation at this point seems appropriate.  Marx allows us to see human beings today in various states of misery through his concept “alienation of labor.”  For Marx, labor is the natural activity of human beings and once again Aristotle and Marx seem to agree on this point.  For Marx, when humans freely engage in labor we are at our best by producing and in turn reproducing ourselves into the world through our labor.  For Marx, when labor becomes an object external from the person engaged in the labor the worker becomes alienated.  The laborer must have ownership in the production process in order to be engaged in “free conscious activity.”  Without ownership in the production process, Marx tells us, “We arrive at the result that…(the worker) feels himself to be freely active only in his animal functions- eating, drinking and procreating…”[14]


Money, in Marx’s view, only exacerbates the worker’s alienation.  Money in return for labor, as opposed to ownership in work performed, abstracts the process of labor and extracts enjoyment from laboring toward a goal of completion.  At the end of a labor project, the worker receives money with an expectation to forget their time and energy invested in creation.  Money becomes the most important aspect of this labor process rather than an inner sense of accomplishment inherent in producing a quality product.  Therefore, the labor (i.e. the job) has been reduced to only the reward of money and money is a relative object.  With Freud’s idea of repressed desires added to this situation, we might understand our misunderstood, repressed desires now become entangled with our need for money and money then becomes the object by which we imagine we might fulfill our repressed desires.  This, in turn, leads to more conversation about money and, as Gadamer has shown us, our conversations generate our interpretations which might demonstrate why we speak so highly of money and our perceived need of more money.




Money makes the world go round.  This should not be a foreign expression to most Americans, because it seems to be how we currently govern one another (and by extension, how we attempt to govern the world.)  As Marx predicts, or observes, “Excess and immoderation become it’s [i.e. money’s] true standard.”[15]  At its best, money enables us to buy those items which allow us to survive.  At its worst, Marx shows us, money allows the dull-witted among us to purchase the talents of the intelligent and wise.  In this very act, the nature of the world is turned on its head because it seems the dull-witted should not have the power to control the actions of their intellectual superiors.


As Marx seems to describe the world in which we currently reside, we may need to fight an urge to fall back into a sense of shock and an inability to see a way forward.  The current construction of our world seems far too entrenched in moneyed activities to expect any change.  However, John Stuart Mill may suggest a way forward for the advocate.  Mill posits that “in an imperfect state of the human mind the interests of truth require a diversity of opinion.”[16]  Where Marx’s final solution required revolution, Mill points out that “even in revolutions of opinion, one part of the truth usually sets while another rises.”[17]  Mill allows us to see revolution is not the answer, because we can only substitute one set of prejudices for another.


Mill seems to embrace the limitations described by psychoanalysis and Gadamer.  Rather than struggling to understand repressed desires from within the interpretations of an expert, or aimlessly striving to achieve a Truth that doesn’t exist outside of the realm of interpretation; Mill tells us, “There is always hope when people are forced to listen to both sides.”[18]  John Stuart Mill advocates for the free expression of opinion for all people on four grounds. 


First, Mill tells us silencing an opinion may be equal to silencing the truth.  Second, he explains we only rarely possess the full truth at any given time.  By repressing even an erroneous statement, we run the risk of missing even a portion of truth which may only reveal itself through the clash of differing opinions.  Third, Mill suggests that even if we currently possess the truth; we risk losing the full sense of that truth if we don’t allow reaffirmation to occur through the combat of differing opinions.  It is only through the testing of a truth against falsehoods that we can know what we believe is in fact true.  Finally, Mill asserts that by not allowing fallacious statements to be expressed we also risk losing the vitality of what we believe to be true, because the truth may simply become something we say out of habit[19] (as opposed to Aristotle’s teaching we need to habitually execute what we believe to be true.)  We are always accountable for what we say.  There is no escaping accountability because our relationships in the world are impacted by the conversations we engage in with one another.


For the advocate, Marx allows us to see workers today alienated from their labor (i.e. their working life.)  Mill’s view, illustrates for the advocate why people should not be alienated from expressing their opinion.  It seems easy to interpret that today free expression of opinion is at best a homily sung to children from text books written by corporate, moneyed interests.  If free expression of opinion were a reality in
America today, criticism of war would not be shouted down with cynicism wrapped in jingoistic patriotism.  If free expression of opinion were a reality in America today, criticism of capitalism would not be met with admonitions of appearing communist.  If free expression of opinion were a reality in America today, citizens would have as much access to members of the federal government as lobbyists and large campaign donors. 


For the advocate, it might prove beneficial to view John Stuart Mill’s model of free expression metaphorically as a model of government that formalizes Gadamer’s concept of understanding through conversation as well as psychoanalysis’ concept of speaking to interpret our repressed desires.  Adam Phillips says, “When we make a slip of the tongue, something in us speaks out of turn.  It does not speak more truthfully, but it speaks as well.”[20]  Phillip’s view of the individual expanded metaphorically to the body politic better allows for the free expression of opinion and seems to parallel what Mill teaches us.  For the advocate, energy seems best expended for changing the future for the better by focusing on citizens today.


Aristotle tells us,

"The end of political science is the highest good and the chief concern of this science is to endue the citizens with certain qualities, namely virtue and the readiness to do fine deeds."[21]


Aristotle took this sentiment further by declaring,

"Legislators make their citizens good by habituation; this is the intention of every legislator, and those who do not carry it out fail of their object."[22]

     
Habituation seems best constructed at an early age.  Do not misunderstand though.  This is not a call for advocating on behalf of gaining more control over the youth of today.  Control is not a missing component of any modern civilization.  Control is already exerted upon each of us as citizens of the country in which we reside.  Teaching habituation takes place in the schools of
America today; however it seems, the advocate must caress and focus the methods of habituation we currently employ on our youth in mandatory public education as well as fine tuning the goals of that instruction.


The goals associated with instructed habituation aimed at youth today provides the advocate with a focus for affecting a better tomorrow.  For the advocate to set such goals, it seems, the advocate should always bear in mind that any end state can only be understood through interpretation; therefore, no goal can be stated to be the one true answer to a better tomorrow which, in turn, suggests that goals should be broadly stated when formulating new forms of education as instructed habits.  If we accept our desires as repressed and unknown to us, then we must be suspicious of goals that seem to be for the better of any one group of individuals.  Where one group ascends, it seems, another must fall.


The will of the majority, as represented by democracy, seems the best hope we can ask for in our current state of affairs.  Democracy carries positive connotations for many because it seems right.  Every voice has its opportunity for expression which continues a conversation allowing a story of better tomorrows to arise from the citizenry.  As with Freud’s slip of the tongue, the masses speaking in freedom may also prove to allow our repressed desires to surface and, if psychoanalysis is to be believed, a healing of sorts may take place.  However, without advocates working for the free expression of opinion in communal government; it seems that humans may never realize such a tomorrow.


The largest obstacle to achieving such a tomorrow is a populace unprepared to speak its opinions freely.  Habits related to that practice must first be taught and then repeated as children in order for the populace to ever be ready to execute such a society.  From Aristotle, we might withdraw a need for habits to be formed around prudence as well.  From John Stuart Mill, we learn the need to test our prejudices against the opinions of others.  From Freud and Gadamer, we learn that people speaking differently to one another in fact changes the world.[23]  Allow Gadamer to demonstrate to citizens “That all understanding inevitably involves some prejudice”[24] and then maybe advocates might find a better tomorrow occurring today.


Ultimately, John Stuart Mill may provide the impetus advocates today need to advocate when he says,

The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it…a State which dwarfs its [citizens,] in order that they may be more docile instruments in its hands even for beneficial purposes- will find that with small [citizens] no great thing can really be accomplished.[25]


In the end, we should be advocating on behalf of great things and Mill’s statement just seems right.




[1] Erich Fromm, Marx’s Concept of Man, (London: Continuum, 2004), 84.

[2] John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, (London: Penguin Books, 1974), 187.

[3] Sigmund Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, (London: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc, 1966) 210.

[4] Sigmund Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, 222.

[5] Sigmund Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, 287.

[6] Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Continuum Publishing Group, 2006) 387.

[7] Adam Phillips, Terrors and Experts, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1997) 12.

[8] Adam Phillips, Terrors and Experts, 7.

[9] Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Continuum Publishing Group, 2006) 279.

[10] Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 402.

[11] Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 315.

[12] Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. J.A.K. Thomson (London: Penguin Books, 2004) 31-32.

[13] Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. J.A.K. Thomson (London: Penguin Books, 2004) 32.

[14] Erich Fromm, Marx’s Concept of Man, (London: Continuum, 2004), 82.

[15] Erich Fromm, Marx’s Concept of Man, (London: Continuum, 2004), 113.

[16] John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, (London: Penguin Books, 1974), 114.

[17] John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, 119.

[18] John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, 115.

[19] John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, (London: Penguin Books, 1974), 115- 116.

[20] Adam Phillips, Terrors and Experts, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1997) 7.

[21] Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. J.A.K. Thomson (London: Penguin Books, 2004) 21.

[22] Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. J.A.K. Thomson, 32.

[23] Adam Phillips, Terrors and Experts, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1997) 28.

[24] Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Continuum Publishing Group, 2006) 272.

[25] John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, (London: Penguin Books, 1974), 187.

 

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