From The Nazi Seizure of Power by William Sheridan Allen
By the end of the winter of 1931-1932, conditions in Northeim were favorable to the rapid advance of Nazism. The depression was at its worst, violence was becoming more frequent, and the twin passions of nationalism and class antagonism were at their height. Northeim's Nazis had established themselves as both respectable and radical. They were seen as patriotic, anti-Socialist, and religious. They enjoyed the apparent blessings of the conservatives. But at the same time the Nazis appeared to be vigorous, determined and, above all, ready to use radical means to deal with the crucial problem—the depression. Ordinary measures had been proved sufficient for welfare efforts, but only extreme measures would end the depression and only the Nazis were thought of as sufficiently extreme. All that was needed to complete the favourable situation was the whip of new election campaigns.
The propitious circumstances were not, of course, predominantly local. Despites its constant activity in Northeim, the NSDAP won its first successes there only after democracy deteriorated on the national level. Beginning in 1930, a stable majority was unobtainable in the Reichstag and the chancellor, Bruning, began to issue laws over the head of the parliament by using Hindenburg's presidential emergency powers. Though Bruning's decrees were unpopular with the SPD, the Socialists refused to topple him because they feared the turmoil of elections would result in further Nazi and Communist gains. Hence a queasy stalemate existed in Germany from the spring of 1930 to the spring of 1932: the country was ruled by unpopular laws, issued not on the authority of a democratic parliament, but on that of the aging Field Marshal who had been elected president in 1925.
The only justification for such a debilitating procedure would have been success in dealing with the depression. But Bruning's harsh deflationary measures, based on economic orthodoxy, actually intensified the effects of the depression, and the Nazis successfully labeled him the "Hunger Chancellor." The only benefit of Bruning's semi-authoritarian rule was political stagnation in the sense that new elections were avoided. In 1932 even this came to an end as Hindenburg's term ran out. The final condition for Nazi growth in Northeim was thus present.
The presidential election was set for March 13, 1932. Hindenburg stood for reelection and was backed by Republican parties from the SPD to the People's party. The Nazis ran Hitler, and the Communists also entered a candidate—the veteran Stalinist Ernst Thaelmann. The Nationalists, unwilling to support Hindenburg because he had not subverted the Republic, and not yet willing to throw in their lot with Hitler, nominated the deputy commander of the Stalhelm, Duesterberg. There was also a crackpot named Winter who managed to get on the ballot. But almost every German saw the essential contest in terms of Hitler versus Hindenburg.
In Northeim the first, almost predicatable sign of the impending election was an upsurge in violence.
The propitious circumstances were not, of course, predominantly local. Despites its constant activity in Northeim, the NSDAP won its first successes there only after democracy deteriorated on the national level. Beginning in 1930, a stable majority was unobtainable in the Reichstag and the chancellor, Bruning, began to issue laws over the head of the parliament by using Hindenburg's presidential emergency powers. Though Bruning's decrees were unpopular with the SPD, the Socialists refused to topple him because they feared the turmoil of elections would result in further Nazi and Communist gains. Hence a queasy stalemate existed in Germany from the spring of 1930 to the spring of 1932: the country was ruled by unpopular laws, issued not on the authority of a democratic parliament, but on that of the aging Field Marshal who had been elected president in 1925.
The only justification for such a debilitating procedure would have been success in dealing with the depression. But Bruning's harsh deflationary measures, based on economic orthodoxy, actually intensified the effects of the depression, and the Nazis successfully labeled him the "Hunger Chancellor." The only benefit of Bruning's semi-authoritarian rule was political stagnation in the sense that new elections were avoided. In 1932 even this came to an end as Hindenburg's term ran out. The final condition for Nazi growth in Northeim was thus present.
The presidential election was set for March 13, 1932. Hindenburg stood for reelection and was backed by Republican parties from the SPD to the People's party. The Nazis ran Hitler, and the Communists also entered a candidate—the veteran Stalinist Ernst Thaelmann. The Nationalists, unwilling to support Hindenburg because he had not subverted the Republic, and not yet willing to throw in their lot with Hitler, nominated the deputy commander of the Stalhelm, Duesterberg. There was also a crackpot named Winter who managed to get on the ballot. But almost every German saw the essential contest in terms of Hitler versus Hindenburg.
In Northeim the first, almost predicatable sign of the impending election was an upsurge in violence.
Excellent read, I just passed this onto a colleague who was doing a little research on this topic.
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This book offers an interesting perspective on the rise of Nazi power from the perspective of a small German hamlet. I'd strongly recommend reading it to anyone interested in understanding how a democracy turns into a dictatorship.
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Thank you! Took himself too-handy.
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